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Abstract In the paper the class of linear quadratic cooperative dierential
games with continuous updating is considered. Here the case of feedback
based strategies is used to construct cooperative strategies with continuous
updating. Characteristic function with continuous updating, cooperative tra-
jectory with continuous updating and cooperative solution are constructed.
For the cooperative solution we use the Shapley value.
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1. Introduction
Most of the real-life conict-driven processes evolve continuously in time, and
their participants continuously receive updated information and adapt. Main mod-
els considered in the classical dierential game theory are associated with problems
dened on a xed time interval (Kleimenov, 1993), problems dened on an in-
nite time interval with discounting (Basar and Olsder, 1995), problems dened on
a random time interval (Shevkoplyas, 2014). One of the rst works in the theory
of dierential games is devoted to the dierential pursuit game (Petrosyan and
Murzov, 1966). In all the above models and approaches it is assumed that at the
beginning of the game players know all information about the game dynamics and
player's preferences. However, these approaches do not take into account the fact
that in many real conict-controlled processes, players at the initial time instant
do not have all information about the game. Therefore classical approaches for
dening in some sense optimal strategies (for example, Nash equilibrium), such as
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957) or the Pontryagin maximum
principle (Pontryagin, 1966), cannot be directly used to construct a large range of
real game-theoretic models.
Most conict-driven processes in real-life evolve continuously in time, and their
participants continuously receive updated information and adapt accordingly. This
paper is dedicated to the new class of dierential games with continuous updating,
in particular, the cooperative setting of an autonomous case is considered. In the
game models with continuous updating, it is assumed that players have information
about motion equations and cost functions only on [t, t+T ], where T is information
horizon, t is current time instant, receive updated information regarding motion
equations and cost functions as time t ∈ [t0,+∞) evolves.
In the framework of the dynamic updating approach, the following papers were
published (Petrosian, 2016a; Petrosian, 2016b). Their author laid a foundation for
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further study of a lass of games with dynami updating. It is assumed that the in-
formation about motion equations and payo funtions is updated in disrete time
instants and interval on whih players know the information is dened by the value
of the information horizon. However, the lass of games with ontinuous updat-
ing provides with the new theoretial results. The lass of dierential games with
ontinuous updating was onsidered in the papers (Kuhkarov and Petrosian, 2019;
Petrosian and Tur, 2019), here it is supposed that the updating proess evolves on-
tinuously in time. In the paper (Petrosian and Tur, 2019), the system of Hamilton-
Jaobi-Bellman equations are derived for the Nash equilibrium in a game with
ontinuous updating. In the paper (Kuhkarov and Petrosian, 2019) the lass of
linear-quadrati dierential games with ontinuous updating is onsidered and the
expliit form of the Nash equilibrium is derived.
In this paper, the results of the paper (Kuhkarov and Petrosian, 2019) is ex-
tended. It is interesting to onstrut not only the non-ooperative solution but also
to obtain the form of ooperative strategies, harateristi funtion and ooperative
solution for ontinuous updating ase, i.e. to study ooperative dierential game
model. The main ontribution of this paper lies in the ooperative setting and on-
sideration of an autonomous ase when motion equations and ost funtions do not
expliitly depend on the time parameter.
The paper is strutured as follows. In setion 2., a desription of game model with
ontinuous updating is presented. Setion III is devoted to ooperative strategies
with ontinuous updating. In setion IV, the expliit form of harateristi funtion
and Shapley value for the linear quadrati autonomous game model are presented.
Setion V presents our onlusions.
2. Linear Quadrati Autonomous Game Model with Continuous
Updating
Consider n-player dierential game Γ (x, t, T ), dened on the interval [t, t+ T ],
where t ∈ [t0,+∞), 0 < T < +∞.
Motion equations of Γ (x, t, T ) have the form
ẋt(s) = Axt(s) +B1u
t
1(s, x
t) + . . .+Bnu
t
n(s, x
t), xt(t) = x, (1)
where xt ∈ Rl, ut = (ut1, . . . , utn), uti = uti(s, xt) ∈ Rk, t ∈ [t0,+∞).
Cost funtion of player i ∈ N in the game Γ (x, t, T ) is dened as
Kti (x





















where Qi, Rij are assumed to be symmetri, Rij are positive semi-dened, Rii is
positive dened, ( · )′ means transpose here and hereafter and xt(s), ut(s, x) are
trajetory and strategies in the game Γ (x, t, T ). Player i is minimizing (2).
Dierential game with ontinuous updating evolves aording to the rule:
Time parameter t ∈ [t0,+∞) evolves ontinuously, as a result players ontinu-
ously reeive updated information about motion equations and ost funtions under
Γ (x, t, T ).
Strategies u(t, x) in the game model with ontinuous updating are dened in the
following way:
u(t, x) = ut(t, x), t ∈ [t0,+∞), (3)
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where ut(s, x), s ∈ [t, t + T ] are some xed strategies dened in the subgame
Γ (x, t, T ).
State x(t) in the model with ontinuous updating is dened aording to
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t, x) + . . .+Bnun(t, x), (4)
x(t0) = x0, x ∈ Rl, with strategies with ontinuous updating u(t, x) involved.
The essential dierene between the game model with ontinuous updating and
lassi dierential game Γ (x0, T − t0) with presribed duration is that players in
the initial game are guided by the osts that they will eventually reeive on the
interval [t0, T ], but in the ase of a game with ontinuous updating, at the time
instant t they orient themselves on the expeted osts (2), whih are alulated
using information about the game struture dened on the interval [t, t+ T ].
3. Optimal Cooperative Strategy for Games with Continuous Updating
In a game with ontinuous updating, the player at eah moment fouses on
the nearest event horizon, trying to maximize prots on it. The player hooses the
optimal strategy for, generally speaking, a new game at eah moment in time. And
the optimal strategy for the whole game is made up of eah partiular deision.
For example, onsider two time intervals [t, t+ T ] and [t+ ǫ, t+ T + ǫ], ǫ << T .
Aording to the problem statement, u∗(t, x) at the instant t should oinide with
the optimal ooperative strategy in the game dened on the interval [t, t+ T ] and
u∗(t + ǫ, x) at instant t + ǫ should oinide with the optimal ooperative strategy
in the game dened on the interval [t + ǫ, t + ǫ + T ]. Therefore diret appliation
of lassial approahes for determining optimal ooperative strategy in feedbak
strategies is not possible.
In ooperative ase all players minimize one funtional




t, t, T ;ut), (5)
where Kti (x
t, t, T ;ut) is dened in (2).
To determine the solution of a game with ontinuous updating, we introdue the
onept of a generalized solution as a ombination of solutions in subgames.
Denition 1. Strategy prole ũ∗(t, s, x) = (ũ∗1(t, s, x), . . . , ũ
∗
n(t, s, x)), t ∈ [t0,+∞),
s ∈ [t, t+ T ] is a generalized ooperative solution in the game with ontinuous up-
dating, if for any xed t ∈ [t0,+∞) strategy prole ũ∗(t, s, x) is ooperative solution
in the game Γ (x, t, T ), 0 < T <∞.
Using the generalized ooperative solution it is possible to dene a solution
onept for a game model with ontinuous updating.
Denition 2. Strategy prole u∗(t, x) is alled the ooperative solution with on-
tinuous updating, if it is dened in the following way:
u∗(t, x) = ũ∗(t, s, x)|s=t, (6)
where t ∈ [t0,+∞), ũ∗(t, s, x) is the generalized ooperative solution dened above.
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Strategy prole u∗(t, x) will be used as a solution onept in the ooperative
game with ontinuous updating. Suient onditions for the existene of a ooper-
ative solution with ontinuous updating are presented below.
Theorem 1. For an N-person linear-quadrati dierential game with Qi ≥ 0,
Rij ≥ 0 (i, j ∈ N), Rii > 0 (i ∈ N), let there exist a solution set {Zt, t > t0}
to the matrix Riati dierential equations
Żt(τ) = −TA′Zt(τ)− TZt(τ)A + Zt(τ)SZt(τ) −Q,
Zt(1) = 0,
(7)
where τ ∈ [0, 1], S = T 2BR−1B′, Q = ∑
i∈N
Qi, B and R are blok matries, i. e.
B = [B1, . . . , Bn], R = {Rij}ni,j=1.
Then, the dierential game with ontinuous updating admits a ooperative solu-
tion with ontinuous updating given by
u∗(t, x) = −R−1B′Zt(0)Tx.
Proof. In order to prove the Theorem we introdue the hange of variables.
yt(τ) = xt(t+ Tτ), vti(τ, y) = u
t
i(t+ Tτ, x), i ∈ N. (8)
By substituting (8) to the motion equations (1), ost funtion (5) we obtain





























The Theorem 5.1 from (Engwerda, 2005) and existene of solution for the system
of dierential equations (7) lead to ooperative solution in the subgame Γ (x, t, T )
have the form
vt,∗(τ, y) = −R−1B′Zt(τ)Ty,
Then a generalized ooperative solution in the game with ontinuous updating
has the form






Apply the proedure (6) to determine Nash equilibrium with ontinuous updat-
ing using generalized Nash equilibrium (11):
u∗(t, x) = −R−1B′Zti (0)Tx, t ∈ [t0,+∞), i ∈ N. (12)
This proves the theorem.
4. Cooperative Solution with Continuous Updating
To determine how to alloate joint ost among the players it is neessary to dene
how the overall game evolves, how players foreast their behavior at every urrent
time instant t ∈ [t0,+∞] for the future interval [t, t + T ]: foreasted trajetory,
harateristi funtion, a ooperative solution with ontinuous updating what are
the properties.
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4.1. Charateristi Funtion for Subgame on Interval [t, t + T ]
Consider oalition S in n-player dierential game Γ (x, t, T ) (1) (2). The hara-
teristi funtion is dened as the total ost of the oalition S in the Nash equilibrium
uNE =
(




in a game ΓS(x, t, T ) with the following set of players: a
oalition S ating as one player and players from the set N \ S i. e., in the game of
nS = |N \ S|+ 1 players.
Desribe the building of the auxiliary game ΓS(x, t, T ). Let the rst player
of this game be player assoiated with oalition S for onveniene and let other
players have been renumbered in some way players from N \ S. Relabel matries
for N \ S players AS = A, BSi = Bki , QSi = Qki , Ri,j = Rki,kj , where i, j = 2, nS
and i is new index in ΓS(x, t, T ) of ki-th player from Γ (x, t, T ). Some matries for
oalition player have a blok struture: BS1 = [Bm1 . . . Bmc ] , R
S
1,1 = {Rij}mci,j=m1 ,
RSi,1 = diag(Rki,m1 , . . . , Rki,mc); other  are sum of orresponding matries from








Rm,ki , where m1, . . . ,mc ∈ S, i = 2, nS.
Thus motion equations of ΓS(x, t, T ) have the form
ẋt(s) = ASxt(s) +BS1 u
t
1(s, x





Cost funtion of player i ∈ NS in the game ΓS(x, t, T ) is dened as
KS,ti (x





















where xt(s), ut(s, x) are trajetory and strategies in the game ΓS(x, t, T ).
Lemma 1. For an N -person linear-quadrati dierential game Γ (x, t, T ) with QSi ≥
0, RSij ≥ 0 (i, j ∈ N), RSii > 0 (i ∈ N), let there exist a solution set {ZSi , i ∈ NS , t >
t0} to the matrix Riati dierential equations
dZSi (τ)
dτ





















ZSi (1) = 0, i ∈ N,
(13)
where










Then, the harateristi funtion for game Γ (x, t, T ) has form
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where ξ ∈ [t, t+ T ],












x∗(s, t, x) is solution of system
ẋt(s) = ASxt(s) +BS1 u
t







Proof. We dened the harateristi funtion as the total ost of the oalition S in
the Nash equilibrium in ΓS(x, t, T ).
Similar to theorem 1 proof we use the hange of variables (8), the orollary 6.5
from (Basar and Olsder, 1995) and existene of solution for the system of dieren-
tial equations (13). This implies feedbak-based Nash equilibrium strategies in the
subgame ΓS(x, t, T ) have the form (15).
Aording to building auxiliary game ΓS(x, t, T ) the total ost of the oalition
S ould be alulated as KS,t1 (x
t, t, T , ut). Then funtion (14) is harateristi and
system dynamis evolves by (16).
4.2. Charateristi Funtion with Continuous Updating
Consider a game with ontinuous updating on time interval [t0, T ], where T <<
T. Suppose that the funtion Ṽ t(S; x̃∗t (s), s, t + T ), S ⊆ N is ontinuously dier-
entiable by s ∈ [t, T ] and integrable by t ∈ [t0, T ]. Dene harateristi funtion in
game model with ontinuous updating V (S;x∗(t), t) in the following way:
Denition 3. Funtion V (S;x∗(t), t), t ∈ [t0, T ], S ⊆ N is a harateristi funtion
with ontinuous updating, if it is dened as the following integral:





Ṽ τ (S; x̃∗τ (s), s, τ + T )|s=τdτ, (17)
where t ∈ [t0, T ], S ⊆ N, Ṽ τ (S; x̃∗τ (s), s, t + T ), s ∈ [τ, τ + T ], τ ∈ [t, T ), S ⊆ N
is a harateristi funtion in the game Γ (x̃∗τ (s), s, τ + T ) dened on the interval
[s, t+ T ].
Remark 1. Notie that the integral in (17) an be innite, if T = ∞. Therefore
we suppose T <∞.
Theorem 2. For a oalitions S in N -person linear-quadrati dierential game with
QSi ≥ 0, RSij ≥ 0 (i, j ∈ N), RSii > 0 (i ∈ N), let there exist a solution set
{ZSi , i ∈ NS , t > t0} to the matrix Riati dierential equations (13). Then, the
harateristi funtion with ontinuous updating has form































xt(s), xt(t) = x.
(20)
Proof. Lemma 1 gives the harateristi funtion (14) for subgame Γ (x, t, T ). By
substituting (14) into (17) we get



































By substituting (22) into (21) with (19) we get




















Give (23) in similar terms to (18). Taking into aount (22), (16) we an desribe
system dynamis as (20).
4.3. Shapley Value with Continuous Updating
Suppose that all the players united in a oalition of N , then, moving along the
ooperative trajetory x∗(t), they an seure a total ost of V (N, x∗(t), t, T ). To
determine the osts of eah player i ∈ N , we introdue the onept of imputation
ξ(x∗(t), t, T ) = (ξ1(x
∗(t), t, T ), . . . , ξn(x
∗(t), t, T )), i. e., the ost that the player i
will reeive after the redistribution of the maximum total win V (N, x∗(t), t, T ) be-
tween all players.
As a imputation in the game with ontinuous updating, we will use the Shapley
vetor:
Shi(x




(k − 1)! (n− k)!
n!
×
× (V (S, x∗(t), t, T )− V (S \ {i}, x∗(t), t, T )) ,
(24)
where i = 1, . . . , n, k = |S|.
Let there exist a solution set {ZSi , i ∈ NS , t > t0} to the matrix Riati dieren-
tial equations (13) for every oalition S ⊂ N . Then we an alulate Shapley vetor
(24) where V (S, x∗(t), t, T ) is alulated aording to (18).
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5. Conlusion
The onept of ooperative strategies for the lass of dierential games with on-
tinuous updating is presented. Cooperative strategies in linear-quadrati dierential
games with ontinuous updating are onstruted and the orresponding theorem is
presented. The harateristi funtion for the ooperative ase is onstruted, the
path of possible solutions (e.g. Shapley value) based on it is indiated.
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